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ESSAYS
LAW AND THE CULTURE OF MARRIAGE
GERARD V. BRADLEY*
I
Culture is a human artifact, but not a tangible item like pot-
tery or a hula hoop (even though such tangible items often
reveal things-even important things-about human cultures).
It is perfectly natural for people to create culture. But culture is
not found in nature; it is not given to people by their environ-
ment; and it is not the inevitable manifestation of mental hard-
wiring or biological drives. Culture is the value added by people
acting on the basis of reflection and choice to nature.
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz tells us that "[u] ndirected by
cultural patterns ... man's behavior would be virtually ungovern-
able, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his
experience virtually shapeless."' Culture gives shape, provides
order, supplies the cognitive map. Culture is about meaning, or
what Geertz and other scholars call "symbolism." The question
(please excuse the Clintonian ring) is: what is the meaning of
"meaning"? What does "symbol" here symbolize?
"Meaning" is what distinguishes occurrences in the physical
world-matters of cause and effect in which choice plays no
role-from human acts. Apples fall from trees due to atrophy in
the branch; kids sitting in trees sometimes throw apples at pass-
ersby. An apple falling from a tree is a mere occurrence. An
apple being thrown by a child intending to startle or hurt some-
body is an expression of choice-it is a meaningful (wrongful)
human act.
John Paul II told a UNESCO conference early in his pontifi-
cate that "culture is the realm of the human as such."2 Culture
does indeed have to do with something unique to human beings:
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 46 (1973).
2. Francis George, Law and Culture in the United States, 48 AM.J.JuRis. 131,
133 (2003).
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their capacity for abstraction. This abstraction has to do with
people's purposive and expressive activities, most of all with their
choices. Culture is shaped by what people consider valuable,
choice-worthy, worthwhile, good, as all human acts are intelligi-
ble according to their ends, aims, purposes-the matters for
which we act.
Though woven out of abstraction and intention, culture is
no gossamer tapestry. Studying culture, Geertz says, "is thus not
to abandon social analysis for a Platonic shadow, to enter into a
mentalistic world of introspective psychology or, worse, speculative
philosophy.'' 3 (Let the record show that I here emphasize Geertz's
reticence about philosophy, not mine). Geertz rightly observes
that culture is comprised of "social events . . . as public as mar-
riage and as observable as agriculture."4
Culture is the by-product of so many human choices and acts.
People do not (usually) act for the purpose of making a culture;
they simply choose and act and speak andjoin. When they do so,
they effectively build a culture. When they are done, they leave
behind a culture. But the process is not really sequential. The
deposit of meaning we call culture faces us, in season and out, as
a given, as an objective reality within which we come to know the
world, and think, choose, act, live. The culture (already out
there) influences our choosing and acting, often powerfully and
sometimes conclusively: we cannot choose what we cannot see
and bring to mind as a live option for choice. One's cultural
milieu-for better or for worse-makes certain options unavaila-
ble, even unthinkable.
Culture shapes options, but also eliminates some: the vast
majority of us cannot believe in magic and astrology because we
live in a scientific culture. Some of us do not believe in God for
the same reason. Culture is the world we make; it is the world
which makes us. Culture most profoundly makes us not by con-
fronting us as a recognizably distinct other. Culture does its work
more subtly, entering and shaping the mind silently, as does the
very language we speak.
In all too many cultures genuine friendship between persons
of different races or clans, for example, has been impossible due
to false cultural beliefs about the indelible inferiority of some
group. Stories as diverse as Romeo and Juliet and Driving Miss
Daisy compellingly explore the difficulties of friendship across
cultural divides. In many cultures today parents can scarcely
regard baby girls as they do baby boys. Their culture tells them
3. GEERTZ, supra note 1, at 91.
4. Id.
LAW AND THE CULTURE OF MARRIAGE
to value their children, not intrinsically, but for what the kids can
do-for the nation, for the parents, for the clan. And what girls
can do (compared to boys) is limited by the surrounding cul-
ture's sexist prejudices.
Some theorists of human society (including many law
professors) assert or assume that human existence is determined
the way apes' lives are, and that we are just a bit more sophisti-
cated than other primates. These theorists implicitly deny that
the world of meaning and symbol we call culture matters. For
them culture is all sound and fury signifying nothing more than
imagination and fancy, a mental construct which amuses but
which does not limit and shape people's choices. There theorists
think that people do not really make choices at all, at least not
morally significant free choices.5
An astute critic of this view, Professor Peter Berkowitz, wrote
in The New Republic of game theorists "suppose that the world is
matter in motion and nothing more; that there is no greatest
good or ultimate aim, no human perfection or salvation; that the
primary and only salient motive for human conduct is rational
self-interest."6 Law, according to game theory-at least as it is
typically deployed by practitioners of what is called "the eco-
nomic analysis of law"-is, and can be nothing more than, a tech-
nique for the rational control of human behavior directed by and
towards sub-rationally motivated ends.
This is not to deny that strategic reasoning can be a cultur-
ally hegemonic way of looking at the world. In our scientistic,
technology-driven economy, we often reduce the reasonable to
the rational, and equate the rational with the calculable. But
morally significant free choice cannot be eradicated by culture;
choosing is a fact about persons which persons are incapable of
choosing to obliterate. Where a culture is organized around the
denial of that freedom, one sees a grotesque deformation of free-
dom. The choosing and acting person operates as if in trance,
mesmerized by the cultural imperative to "choose" according to
rational self-interest.
Most of us do not conceive culture in terms of game theory.
Most of us believe in morally significant free choice. We think of
culture as arts, leisure, and entertainment, what the New York
Times covers in a separate section each day, and in a very large
5. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Overcoming Posner, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1898,
1920-22 (1996) (outlining one such theorist, Richard Posner, and his denial of
free will).
6. Peter Berkowitz, The Futility of Utility, NEw REPUBLIC, June 5, 2000, at
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one on Sundays. Culture can be high-brow (like the Met or
Matisse) or down-market, way beneath the Times' notice (NAS-
CAR or nachos).
The difference is both great and small. Things of beauty
there truly are, and great artistic achievements, too. But most of
us recognize that culture in this sense involves legitimate differ-
ences in taste, and that a wide swath of arts, leisure, and
entertainment choices do not have much to do with whether
one's life is going well morally speaking. We are prone, too, to
identify distinctive cultures by morally indifferent matters: cui-
sine, costumes, architecture, pageantry, folkways; and by a peo-
ples' temperament: hot-blooded, melancholy, whimsical, artistic.
This is the cultural diversity of National Geographic. In such
venues, even morally corrupt cultural patterns, such as exploita-
tive labor arrangements or vendettas or oppressive family rela-
tions, may be treated as curiosities.
Culture is much more than museums and art fairs and musi-
cals. Culture is comprised most importantly of large social insti-
tutions and practices: marriage, religion, educational systems,
public morality. These matters have great purchase upon per-
sons' hearts and minds. These things are intimately related to
whether persons' lives go well or poorly. That is, persons' deci-
sions about God, marriage, the value of knowledge, and the like
are central to their well-being.
Cultural formations mediate to each one of us the moral
realities-marriage among them-to which they give expression.
But these cultural formations also hold promissory notes from
the lawgiver; that is, they are crucially affected by the law. Francis
Cardinal George recently stated that "law has peculiar and
unique cultural functions in American society."7
The many components of our culture are largely united by
law, not by blood, not by race, not by religion, not even by
language, but by law. It's the one principal cultural com-
ponent we all have in common .... [L]aw is more impor-
tant in teaching or instructing us than it is in directing us.
... [O]ne must therefore ask how it is that law functions as
a cultural carrier in [this country], and what does that
mean for cultural institutions that are universal [i.e., objec-
tive, natural] but that are qualified by law: marriage, family
[and others] .8
The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken of this profound capac-
ity of positive law to shape an entire culture. Affirming the cen-
7. George, supra note 2, at 135.
8. Id.
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tral holding of Roe v. Wade,9 the Court wrote in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey that "[a]n entire generation has come of age
free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of
women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions
"10 With what effect?
[F] or two decades ... people have organized intimate rela-
tionships and made choices that define their views of them-
selves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception
should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in
the economic and social life of the Nation has been facili-
tated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."
Note well: Casey was not talking about just, or even mainly,
the millions of women who have had abortions. The Casey Court
was talking instead about how Roe altered the psychology and
self-understanding, the dreams and potential achievements, of
every woman. All women, according to the Roe Court, benefit
from the control which abortion assertedly gives them. The
abortion liberty is much like unemployment insurance or Medi-
caid, or any other strand in the social safety net: no matter what
chances one takes with one's money or job, no matter how bad
one's luck turns, one knows that one is not going to starve, or be
left to die with no doctor to lend a hand. Casey effectively tells
women (and men): no matter what chances you take with sex-
even if contraception fails-abortion is your safety net. Accord-
ing to the Court, Roe would have transformed our world, even if
no one had abortions.
II
Civil law often enters into creative partnerships with cultural
institutions and practices it does not make. Public authority
helps these practices and institutions in various ways-it recog-
nizes, ratifies, regulates, promotes, supports, and protects. Law
supervenes upon these institutions, and by so doing creates,
within limits, a legal version or dimension of a particular social
practice or institution. The state's partnership with marriage
and family is the most important example. And the law's version
of marriage (and family) is a powerful influence (as we have
seen) on what marriage is for the people whose law it is.
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
11. Id. at 856.
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This partnership is quite one-sided: law exists for these insti-
tutions because law is for the persons whose well-being and flour-
ishing is dependent upon them. Marriage does not exist for law,
or for the polity, or for the success of the nation-state as a world
historical actor, or for the GNP. 2 Things are the other way
round. Law supports certain institutions of civil society for the
sake of the common good. The common good is that ensemble
of social conditions which make it more or less easy for persons
to perfect themselves, to live worthwhile lives. Law supports
these institutions for the sake of genuine human flourishing. For
the sake of genuine human flourishing, then, the law must shape
its "version" of marriage around the truth about marriage. The
civil law has always recognized that marriage possesses founda-
tional features beyond human choosing. Even the Supreme
Court has often made grateful references to marriage as the pre-
condition of American political institutions. This universal rec-
ognition is manifest in the Court's many declarations in favor of
the choice, or opportunity, to marry as a natural right which the
state must respect, and which it may never abridge.13 All of this
is ultimately an acknowledgment that marriage is a pre-political
moral and cultural institution upon which the law supervenes.
The law recognizes marriage, regulates it, promotes it, protects it.
But law does not create marriage. Even where our law refers to
marriage as a "civil contract," it is mainly to emphasize that per-
sons must freely consent to marriage for the marriage to be valid.
Public authority in America has traditionally protected all
the constitutive features of marriage: monogamous, heterosex-
ual, sexually exclusive, the legitimate context for having children.
William cannot legally marry his male neighbor, or the two sisters
next door, for neither same-sex marriage nor polygamy is possible.
No one in the United States is able, legally speaking, to marry
another so long as one's spouse is alive. "Bigamists" and
"polygamists" are not persons with more than one spouse, for no
one can have more than one spouse. Marriage is, in reality,
monogamous; it is for couples only. A "bigamist" is someone
who, with a spouse still living, attempts to marry another.
The law has never recognized any same-sex couples as mar-
ried because notwithstanding their subjective hopes, dreams, and
beliefs, marriage between a man and another man, or between
two women, is objectively impossible. Marriage, being a two-in-
12. George, supra note 2, 136-37.
13. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (stating that
"[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our
society'").
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one-flesh communion oriented toward procreation, is available
only to couples comprised of man and woman. 4
Oxford legal philosopher Joseph Raz says, "[m] onogamy,
assuming that it is the only morally valuable form of marriage,
cannot be practiced by an individual. It requires a culture which
recognizes it, and which supports it through the public's attitude
and through its formal institutions."'" Corrupt culture and law
conspire to deprive people of the opportunity to choose (real)
marriage where, for example, polygamy is the social norm, or
where wives are treated as chattel, and not as equal spouses. In
the latter situation, where true equality and mutuality between
spouses is unimaginable due to false beliefs about the inferior
nature of women, marriage as a two-in-one-flesh communion is
simply not available for choice.
Raz does not suppose that, in a culture whose law and public
morality do not support monogamy, someone who happens to
believe in it will be unable to restrict himself to having one wife
or will be required to take additional wives. The point, as
expressed by Princeton's Robert George, is rather that
even if monogamy is a key element of a sound understand-
ing of marriage, large numbers of people will fail to under-
stand that or why that is the case-and will therefore fail to
grasp the value of monogamy and the intelligible point of
practicing it-unless they are assisted by a culture which
supports, formally and informally, monogamous marriage.
... Marriage is the type of good which can be participated
in, or fully participated in, only by people who properly
understand it and choose it with a proper understanding
in mind; yet people's ability properly to understand it, and
14. Prohibited marriages based upon consanguinity are a good example
of legally declaring some possible marriages unlawful. The Indiana Supreme
Court succinctly explained the law in the 1910 case of State v. Tucker, 93 N.E. 3
(Ind. 1910). "Incest," the Tucker court said, "is broadly defined as 'sexual inter-
course between persons so nearly related that marriage between them would be
unlawful.'" Id. at 3. The court continued:
It is generally agreed that marriages between persons in the direct lin-
eal line of consanguinity, and also between brother and sister, are
unlawful as against the law of nature, independent of any church
canon or statutory prohibition. This inflexible rule arises from the
institution of the family, the basis of civilized society; and, the rights,
duties, habits, and affections, flowing from that relation. Family inter-
marriages and domestic licentiousness would inevitably confuse paren-
tal and filial duties and affections, and corrupt the moral sentiments
of mankind.
Id.
15. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITv O FREEDOM 162 (1986).
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thus to choose it, depends upon institutions and cultural
understandings that transcend individual choice. 6
Someone who chooses to marry for life to the exclusion of
sex with all others enters into a different relationship than some-
one who does not really choose fidelity unto death. Someone
who enters into a marriage understanding it as procreative enters
into a different relationship from one who does not. All these
persons may, as far as our law is concerned, be married. But the
relationships which these married couples participate in is differ-
ent because-at least partly-of what the law about marriage is.
Legal recognition of same-sex marriage, for example, would
not signal to our country's young people that their government
had reconsidered some matter of policy, had recalculated costs
and benefits, had acted upon new information or the latest tech-
niques-and changed its mind about some regulation. Recog-
nizing same-sex marriage would instead be a state broadcast of a
new (putative) truth about marriage (correcting an ancient
prejudice or lie): marriage is not really ordered to procreation.
What was off the menu of available options, is now on it. What
could not be chosen, now can be. Culture, popular practice, and
individual choices-the whole reality of marriage on offer in the
state-would thus be transformed, even if few same-sex couples
chose to legally marry.
III
How does marriage contribute to the political common
good, such that public authority rightly aims to foster a certain
culture of marriage? Why is marriage unlike other friendships,
which do not call forth a protective legal regime? Most exactly,
why should the procreative orientation of marriage-which
explains its sexual complementarity-be insisted upon by public
authority?
It should be because marriage is truly the procreative com-
munion of spouses; because this constitutive feature of marriage
is vulnerable to legally promoted cultural decay; and because
marriage understood as a procreative union offers great and irre-
placeable benefits to society.
Marriage is the uniquely appropriate context for having chil-
dren, for their coming to be. This unique appropriateness is not a
raw societal interest in population replacement. It is not a mat-
ter of a pro-natalist legislative policy, or of worries about having
16. Robert P. George, 'Same-sex Marriage' and 'Moral Neutrality,' in MAR-
RIAGE AND THE COMMON GOOD 79, 93-94 (Kenneth D. Whitehead ed., 2001).
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enough soldiers and workers. This unique appropriateness does
not depend upon statistical verification of claims about children's
grades, emotional adjustment, or some other measure of social
well-being when they live in traditional mother and father
homes. It is not about providing adequate shelter, food, and
nursing care for children (though taking care of children in
these ways is part of being a good mother or father). Likewise,
the imprudence of public policies encouraging the formation of
families headed by same-sex couples does not depend upon
claims about the comparative disadvantages-by the same statisti-
cal measures-of such households as environments for raising
children. Much less is it about median incomes or quality of
medical care available.
This unique appropriateness is not about social scientific
findings at all. It has rather to do with the valuable human rela-
tionships which the reproductive union of man and woman
makes possible: the married couple as husband and wife; mother
and father; father and daughter; father and son; mother and
daughter; mother and son.
The necessary sexual complementarity of marriage goes well
beyond the biological unity possible for man and woman. It is,
however, partly that. By their marital acts the couple actualize,
or express, in a profound and special way their whole married
life together. When their marital acts bear the fruit of children,
these children are (literally) the issue of their marriage: embodi-
ments and thereby extensions into space and time of their par-
ents' marriage. Mother and father are equally and exclusively
parents of all their children. All the children are, one compared
to the others, equally and wholly the offspring of the same par-
ents. This family-wide equality, mutuality, and natural bond of
identity is the wellspring and ground of love, duty, loyalty, care-
giving-the whole matrix of family life. Nothing can replace it.
This complementarity is also partly psychological. It results
in a unique combination of male and female psyches, tempera-
ments, and culturally shaped roles for the husband/father, wife/
mother, daughter/sister, son/brother. One need not and we do
not endorse all features of our culture's-or any culture's-gen-
der role definition. But some such rough definition and differ-
entiation according to gender is found in every culture, for some
such differentiation is endemic to our experience of life as
embodied males or females.
No society's conception of how a husband, or an eldest
daughter, for example, is to behave is beyond criticism. But being
a wife and mother is scarcely a matter of assuming a socially con-
structed type. It is a natural moral reality upon which culture-
20041
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and law-rightly supervene, and in so doing structure, specify,
reinforce, protect. And in doing so that culture-and law-pro-
mote these great (natural, morally valuable) opportunities for
human flourishing, keeping them alive, intact, and available for
choice of persons within the culture.
These principles of mutuality and equality are no more sub-
tle or beyond the state's concern than is the correct judgment
that the factor of equality of marital friendship lies at, or very
near, the heart of the state's legitimate judgment that polygamy
is not supportable, even to the point of making criminal a per-
son's attempts at plural marriage.
The procreative orientation of marriage not only explains its
sexual complementarity, but the monogamous character of mar-
riage, too. Once marriage is no longer a bodily communion ori-
ented towards procreation, then three or more persons could as
readily constitute a marriage as could two. As one court recently
said, "[t]here is no inherent reason why ... theories, [of same-
sex marriage] including the encouragement of long-term, stable
relationships, the sharing of economic lives, the enhancement of
emotional well-being.., could not equally be applied to groups
of three or more. 1
7
Someone might object: the civil law already has denied the
procreative orientation of marriage. The law does not require
married couples to have children. Infertile couples have always
been able to marry. Many couples marry without a firm inten-
tion to have children and some marrying couples are known to
be sterile. As an Indiana court said, "not all opposite-sex couples
may be able to reproduce on their own, or may wish to have chil-
dren at all."' 8 The objection concludes: to deny same-sex
couples a license to marriage at this point in history is arbitrary.
It is surely true that couples unable or presently unwilling to
have children are permitted to marry. Not every couple mar-
rying must have children in order for marriage to be procreative.
Man and woman, even if infertile, are perfectly able to engage in
the kind of act which is procreative-sexual intercourse. It is
instructive to note that infertility has never been a bar to mar-
riage but that impotence has been. That is, the inability of one
or the other spouse to engage in the marital act, even where chil-
dren are not in view, vitiates the marriage. Barrenness does not.
The law has always sought to treat marriage as a two-in-one-flesh
17. Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946, slip op. at 13 (Ind.
Marion County Super. Ct. May 7, 2003).
18. Id. at 10.
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communion actualized by the reproductive-type acts of the
couple, not as a baby factory.
Our culture has in recent years undermined the institution
of marriage and the moral understandings upon which it rests.
But longstanding features of our legal and religious traditions
still testify to the intrinsic value of marriage as a two-in-one-flesh
communion. Consummation has traditionally (though, perhaps,
not universally) been recognized by civil as well as religious
authorities as an essential element of marriage. "Physical defects
and incapacities which render a party unable to consummate the
marriage, existing at the time of the marriage, and which are
incurable are, under most statutes, grounds for annulment
.... 19 This requirement for the validity of a marriage, where in
force, has never been treated as satisfied by an act of sodomy, no
mater how pleasurable. Nothing less (or more) than an act of
genital union consummates a marriage;20 such an act consum-
mates a marriage even if the act is not particularly pleasurable.
Unless otherwise impeded, couples who know they are sterile can
lawfully marry so long as they are capable of consummating their
marriage by performing such an act.21 The way our law contrib-
utes to the cultural maintenance of marriage as the procreative
communion of husband and wife is precisely by limiting it to one
man and one woman.
Another objection: in a diverse society such as our own, the
civil institution of marriage should swing free from all moral con-
ceptions of it, even if those conceptions are accepted (for sake of
argument) as objective, and even true. The idea might be to
expand, or flatten out, the legal contours of marriage, so as to
make it available to everyone on his own terms. The idea might
be, in other words, to privatize marriage.
Even this revised suggestion must be rejected. One wonders
about the intelligibility of "privatized" civil marriage: what could
it mean to say that there is a public interest in marriage, but we
do not know what marriage is. Strange as it may sound, this is the
view on offer from Justice Brennan: "Even if we can agree ...
that 'family' and 'parenthood' are part of the good life, it is
absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of those
terms and destructive to pretend that we do."22 On this prof-
fered view, public authority cannot reason about its treatment of
19. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Annulment of Marriage § 30 (1962) (footnote omitted).
20. Id. § 32.
21. Id. § 30.
22. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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marriage, for marriage is a cipher. Given Justice Brennan's sup-
positions, one could only be promoting an expansive (and
unrealistic) notion of an individual's liberty to define certain
matters as they wish. Justice Brennan anticipated, in other
words, the Mystery Passage of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
notion at the heart of the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas.23
To that case I turn.
IV
The Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas addressed the con-
stitutionality of a statute which made it a crime for two persons of
the same gender to perform certain sexual acts. The Court's
holding was limited to the validity of the challenged statute and
rested upon the view that, as the majority reasoned, the statute
"demean [ed]" homosexuals by making their private, consensual
intimacies a crime.24 In the course of its opinion, however, the
majority observed that persons in a homosexual relationship
"may seek autonomy" for various "personal decisions"-includ-
ing marriage-'just as heterosexual persons do."25
Commentators on both sides of the same-sex marriage ques-
tion-as well as the dissenting justices-think Lawrence is a pre-
view of the majority's views on so-called "gay marriage."
Whatever else one might say about such speculation, nothing in
Lawrence logically precludes state limitation of marriage to the
union of man and woman.
First, the expansive language in the Lawrence majority opin-
ion is dictum. The decision's ratio does not imply or entail that
same-sex marriage is constitutionally required. The majority con-
cluded that the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state inter-
est, that it was a meddlesome "intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual."26 But no one doubts that the legal
definition of marriage is a great public matter. Declining to
endorse certain relationships as marriages is not a meddlesome
interference in anyone's bedroom activities.
Second, the Lawrence majority repeatedly said that it took no
position on the marriage question. "The present case does not
involve," said the Court, "whether the government must give for-
mal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
23. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
24. Id. at 2484.
25. Id. at 2481-82.
26. Id. at 2484.
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seek to enter. '2' Elsewhere the majority said that the law ought
to steer clear of consensual sexual intimacies, absent "abuse of an
institution the law protects. '28 The Lawrence court clearly did not
want its ruling, however portentous some claim it to be, to be
authoritative in a case such as this.
Third, the reasoning behind the most expansive comments of
the Lawrence Court must be treated with great caution. The
majority relied chiefly upon the Mystery Passage of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, an abortion liberty case in which three jus-
tices joined to claim that:
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State.
29
This passage supports the individual's liberty to come to his
deepest beliefs without coercion and without being punished for
the conclusions he reaches. But Indiana has taken no steps to
deny anyone's beliefs in the value or desirability of certain rela-
tionships. No same-sex couple is precluded from believing that
they are married, or from seeking and obtaining private or relig-
ious recognition of their partnership as a marriage. In fact, none
of the Plaintiffs in the Indiana case Morrison v. Sadler complained
of coercion, or of molestation, or of any discrimination whatso-
ever, save that in the marriage law itself: man and woman, only."0
The Supreme Court's post-Casey (but pre-Lawrence) decisions
make it clear, moreover, that philosophical abstractions such as
the Mystery Passage are not founts of fundamental rights.
Abstractions such as personal autonomy are, at most, useful
descriptions of some of the Court's holdings.
By choosing th [e] language [of the Mystery Passage] the
Court's opinion in Casey described, in a general way and in
light of our prior cases, those personal activities and deci-
sions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in
our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our con-
cept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment .... That many of
the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2478.
29. Id. at 2481 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
30. See Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946, slip op. at 5, 6, 13,
14 (Ind. Marion County Super. Ct. May 7, 2003).
2004]
202 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY (Vol. 18
Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate,
and personal decisions are so protected, .... and Casey did
not suggest otherwise.3 1
Glucksberg was, until Lawrence, the Court's standing order on
Due Process methodology. Glucksberg established beyond doubt
that fundamental rights do not arise from the urgency or inten-
sity with which proponents advance their claims on behalf of
them, from the asserted importance of the matter to them, or
from any subjective basis at all. Rather, "the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, 'deeply rooted' in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."32 A glance at that history and tradition conclusively shows
that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage. This
history and tradition are decisive here, notwithstanding the fer-
vent hopes and beliefs of the Morrison Plaintiffs.
Fourth, the Lawrence Court's reliance upon Casey is, at most,
suggestive, if it is not merely incautious rhetoric. The majority
asserted that homosexual couples have the same interests as
heterosexuals do with regard to "contraception" and "procrea-
tion.""3 The assertion is absurd. Same-sex couples have no inter-
est in contraception, much less one comparable to opposite-sex
couples. That is because same-sex couples can engage in no act
which might result in pregnancy. Contraception, by definition,
has to do with preventing a new life from coming to be by acts of
sexual intercourse.
Same-sex couples have no interest comparable to heterosex-
uals in "procreation." "Procreation" refers in both legal and
common usage to the natural generation of new life through acts
of sexual intercourse. It may be that same-sex couples can coop-
erate with other people in the production of a new human life
which bears a genetic relationship to one of them. But no issue
of the couple is possible; neither two men nor two women can
conceive a child of their own.
In no case does a same-sex couple stand on the same footing
as a heterosexual couple reproducing by assisted artificial means.
Married couples sometimes produce their genetic child with arti-
ficial assistance at say, an in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinic. But in
IVF the gametes of husband and wife spontaneously fuse in a
dish. The resulting embryo is then implanted and nurtured in
31. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 (1997) (citations
omitted).
32. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
33. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481-82 (2003).
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the wife/mother's uterus. In this resort to IVF, a baby comes to
be just as it would in the wife's fallopian tubes; the baby is geneti-
cally a unique and unrepeatable combination of the couple, and
is nurtured in the womb as is any other child. Same-sex couples
necessarily have to rely upon third (and maybe fourth and fifth)
parties for production of a baby, thus implicating the rights of
persons outside the couple.
Lastly, Lawrence is an opinion torn at its center. The major-
ity separated legal protection and preservation of opposite-sex
marriage from the question-there decided-of complete sexual
liberty for consenting adults. The majority strived to preserve
state authority to protect marriage against "abuse" by non-marital
sexual conduct. But these justices seem to have forgotten what
Justice Harlan said on behalf of the whole legal tradition: public
morals laws regarding sex are not meddlesome interferences in
persons' bedrooms. They are not oppressive denials of auton-
omy. They are justified, wholly and entirely, by their tendency to
protect marriage against abuse.3 4
V
The Lawrence dictum signals that the Court will soon declare
that marriage may not be limited to the union of man and
woman. This is most likely to be a Full Faith and Credit contro-
versy, in which two men or two women married in Massachusetts
(in the wake of the Goodridge decision 5 ) unsuccessfully seek mar-
ital benefits in a domicile state. The question then will be, does
the U.S. Constitution require interstate portability of Massachu-
setts "same-sex marriage"? Either way there is a very real pros-
pect, if not probability, that "same-sex marriage" will be judicially
imposed upon the nation in the near future.
The only sure way to preserve marriage in this litigation envi-
ronment is by constitutional amendment.
The Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) as introduced
into the House of Representatives reads:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the
union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or
the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall
be construed to require that marital status or the legal inci-
34. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
35. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003).
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dents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or
groups."
In my judgment, the FMA deserves support. Since almost
everyone who favors "same-sex marriage" opposes the FMA for
that reason, I chiefly address objections to the FMA by those
opposed to "same-sex marriage." There are several such
objections.
Some people think that the meaning of sentence one (SI) is
symbolic or semantic. They think that the FMA is no obstacle to
giving the substance of marriage to unmarried couples. Their
position is like that of the Vermont Supreme Court which in
1999 reduced marriage to a word, a verbal distinction.3 7 That
court held that precisely the same legal benefits had to be
extended to all couples wishing to marry, including two men or
two women.3 8 The court allowed that same-sex unions might be
called something else. 39 They are. In Vermont same-sex couples
may not "marry," but they may enter "civil unions"-and between
the two there is no legal difference whatsoever.
Some political leaders are delighted to hold this view of the
FMA. It allows them to seem both traditional-marriage, they
say, is special and just for man and woman-and progressive at
the same time. They insist that there be no discrimination in
benefits and privileges when it comes to gay and lesbian couples
and their families! A few traditionalist supporters of marriage
hold the semantic view and are happy, too. They think that a
symbolic victory is worth the effort, and that nothing more is pos-
sible. But most traditionalists who think S1 is symbolic are critics
of the FMA. They complain that marriage by any other name is
still marriage. They say that any amendment worth fighting for
must reserve the substance of marriage to man and woman.
Occasionally, it is said that the FMA authorizes civil unions.
This is surely mistaken. Nothing in the FMA can plausibly be
read to authorize anything. The FMA contains no grant of power.
No duty to enact anything is imposed upon any branch or level
of government. The FMA is prohibitory only.
The question is, how far does the prohibition go? Looking
only at 51, the FMA goes a lot further than the semanticists think
it does. Looking at the whole FMA, I think it concedes nothing to
homosexuals and lesbians, or to any other unmarried, sexually
intimate couple.
36. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
37. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
38. Id. at 886.
39. Id.
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Let us look first at S1 by itself. There is no reason a priori to
think that it is about a word, or that it is a symbolic gesture. In
other legal contexts a reference to a long-standing and well-
defined institution-say, to the "navy," the "legislature," "trial by
jury," or a "corporation"-would not be taken as symbolic, or as
an invitation to play word games. No one thinks that a constitu-
tional provision prohibiting states from having a "navy" allows
the governor to have as many battleships as he wants, so long as
he called them his "armada" or his "yacht club." In our nation
criminal defendants are guaranteed "trial by jury." This has
never been thought to mean that a judge could decide a case
alone, just by calling himself the 'jury."
The most natural reading of S1 is the mirror-opposite of the
semantic trivialization: marriage is, wholly and entirely, reserved
to the union of man and woman. Our governor is not allowed
any battleships. (Maybe he gets a few small gunboats to catch
harbor bandits. But that is it.) The jury we have is pretty much
thejury as it has always been. "Trial by jury" is a large, complex
institution. When we say it is guaranteed, we presumably mean
that the whole thing is.
The second sentence (82) of the FMA confirms-and modi-
fies-this reading of S1. S2 implies that some "legal incidents"
may be legislatively granted to unmarried couples. 82 evidently
presupposes that otherwise S1 might be read to prohibit all such
concessions. S2 is the FMA's way of telling us that S1 is no
symbol.
Would the FMA invalidate the Vermont civil union law? The
text is probably subject to contrary interpretation. My view is that
S1 does invalidate "civil unions." Here is why.
Vermont civil union is simply marriage by another name. S1
renders unconstitutional the legal recognition of any non-marital
relationship defined, even partly, by the sexual acts of the partici-
pants. The typical same-sex benefits lawsuit describes the Plain-
tiffs' relationship as "loving, committed, intimate"-plainly
describing a sexual relationship. S1 bars government recogni-
tion of that relationship. Sometimes they are described as a
"couple," indicating a life together well beyond the platonic.
This is not to say that no benefit could be extended to those two
people, as discussion of S2 shortly makes clear. But any such
concession would have to be under another, non-sexual descrip-
tion, so that the benefit was not limited to unmarried couples
engaging in sex.
Let me make the point plainly. Suppose two elderly widow-
ers and life-long friends share quarters and household chores.
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They generally take care of each other. Let's call them Bob and
Bill. Next door to them reside Jack and Joe. They share a house,
checkbook, and a bed. Should the state legislature decide to
facilitate the household life (and community) of persons not
bound by marriage or family ties, the FMA requires them to be
inclusive, non-discriminatory: they may not exclude Bill and Bob
because they do not engage in non-marital sex.
Critics on both sides of the FMA complain that it would
impose a single definition of marriage on all fifty states (and the
federal government, too). Just so, at least regarding the number
of persons in a marriage-two-and their gender-man and
woman. Critics claim that defining marriage has always been the
business of the states, and that it should remain so. The claim
about state authority is false and, in any event, I do not think the
objection is a sound one: even if it were the case that defining
marriage has been the state's job, the same-sex marriage threat is
national, and so should be the response. As Robert Bork said,
"One way or another federalism is going to be overridden. The
only question is whether the general rule will permit or prohibit
the marriage of same-sex couples."4 °
"Federalism" is shorthand for the "let-the-states-continue-
defining-marriage" criticism. By "federalism" the critics (and
Judge Bork) mean mainly the limited autonomy of the fifty states
from the national government based in Washington, D.C. (They
may also refer to the states' freedom concerning each other.)
But this is not all there is to federalism. Besides autonomy there
is comity among the states. Interstate respect and deference
make possible the necessary cooperation among the fifty parts of
the one political community. This aspect of federalism threatens
marriage, and calls for the FMA. For interstate comity, as
enforced by the constitutional norm that each state give full faith
and credit to the public acts of sister states, means that any one
state could spread "same-sex marriage" throughout the land.
Here is the problem. If you are married, you were married
in one state. When (if) you moved to another state, you did not
marry again. You acted and were treated as if you were married
without going through a local ceremony. In fact, you could
move from one to all fifty states, and never have to say "I do"
again. No matter what anyone thinks about marriage and the
law, no one thinks it is really local; unlike, say, handgun privi-
leges or tax liabilities, marriage does not change-stop and
40. Robert Bork, Editorial, Stop Courts from Imposing Gay Marriage, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 7, 2001, at A14.
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start-because you cross from Ohio into Indiana. That is why
the constitutional rule is: "married here, married everywhere."
Nobody knows for sure if that is how it will work when the
first Massachusetts same-sex couples "marry.'"41 There are lim-
ited exceptions to the rule of interstate portability; the legal doc-
trine is unclear, and it has never been applied to same-sex
marriage (since there have been no same-sex marriages). But it
is easy to see that the threat is real, that it is grave, and that it is
imminent. In these circumstances, it would be imprudent to rely
upon courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to halt the
spread of "same-sex marriage" by creating an exception to the
rule of "married here, married everywhere."
Is it true that we have always left the definition of marriage
to the states? The strongest statement to that effect in our consti-
tutional law is from an 1877 Supreme Court case called Pennoyer
v. Neff" a state has an "absolute" right to decide, not quite what
marriage is, but the "conditions upon which the marriage rela-
tion ... shall be created."42 By 1971 the Supreme Court in Boddie
v. Connecticut"3 found the state's power much less "absolute":
marriage was under the control of the states, "absent some spe-
cific federal constitutional or statutory provision."4" By now the
claim that states define marriage is grossly mistaken. For better
or worse, the national government, principally the courts, have
taken the power to define marriage out of the states' hands. The
Supreme Court's promissory note in Lawrence-that it will
require same-sex marriage as part of everyone's liberty to express
oneself sexually, without suffering discrimination-would be the
final stage of this takeover.
Consider the defining features of marriage (besides sexual
complementarity). These features are, first, that marriage
requires the knowing consent of the man and the woman; that
marriage is monogamous; sexually exclusive; the morally legiti-
mate context for raising kids; (more or less) permanent. What is
the autonomy of the states with regard to each of these defining
features?
Let us start with consent. States are doubtlessly free to spec-
ify the principle of consent in different ways. Is sixteen years old
enough to freely and knowingly enter marriage? Is eighteen? Is
this (or that) proof enough of minimal mental competence
41. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003).
42. 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877).
43. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
44. Id at 389 (Black, J., dissenting).
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enough? There is not and need not be a single national answer
to these questions. But no state is constitutionally free to disre-
gard the principle of consent. No state could impose the duties
of marriage upon anyone who was not really-that is, volunta-
rily-married due to duress or incompetence. Any person
against whom an action to enforce marital obligations is insti-
tuted would have a constitutional defense, namely,
involuntariness.
The ubiquity of consent may seem unexceptional, and in
our country it is uncontroversial. States do a good job of protect-
ing the right not to be duped or cajoled or coerced into mar-
riage. On the other hand, some societies still respect forced
marriages, and that we are protected by our Constitution against
it is important, if taken for granted.
Before considering the other defining marital features
listed, let us examine two special cases of national intervention in
marriage. One is Loving v. Virginia, the 1967 Supreme Court case
which told states they could not ban interracial marriage.45 The
language of the case as well as constitutional logic extend the
Court's holding from racial distinctions to ethnic, national,
color, and religious barriers to marriage. Loving means that race
(and ethnicity, color, nationality) has nothing to do with the defi-
nition of marriage. A white person can marry a black person just
as two whites or two blacks can marry each other. No state can
say or suggest that your son ought to marry an Italian girl from
Cleveland, however much you devoutly wish for it.
The second special case is Roe v. Wade.46 Along with earlier
contraception cases, Roe effectively bars states from acting on the
view that marital acts ought to be open to new life. And Roe (per-
haps, more exactly, Roe and its progeny) does something else to
marriage which is potentially devilish: the abortion liberty means
that one spouse-the wife-may unilaterally decide to destroy
the unborn issue of the marriage, the child of the father/hus-
band. No state can do a thing about it. Roe is bad enough for
giving our land legal abortion. But its destruction of the mutual-
ity proper to spouses is monstrous, too.
Monogamy was effectively decreed by the national govern-
ment towards the end of the nineteenth century, in the course of
its protracted struggle with the Mormons over polygamy. Read
any one of the Supreme Court opinions upholding the muscular
anti-polygamy laws then passed by Congress, and you will surely
45. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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think polygamy violates our Constitution.47 In a sense it may, but
that may not be a precisely accurate rendition of the cases. But
those holdings do establish that no one has a right, even on the
basis of sincere religious belief, to enter a polygamous marriage.
47. In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed, among
other questions, whether federal legislation prohibiting polygamous marriages
in federal territories violated the First Amendment by criminalizing behavior
that was sanctioned by the defendant's religion, namely Mormonism. 98 U.S.
145, 161-62 (1878). The Court found that the Constitution was not violated by
the law stating that laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opin-
ions" but holding that such laws "may [interfere] with practices." Id. at 166.
More interesting however, was the language the Court used in reaching this
conclusion. The importance of the institution of marriage was precisely why
the guarantees of religious freedom could not be seen as to protect polygamy.
The Court stated that "[plolygamy has always been odious among northern and
western nations of Europe" and that the practice had been relegated to Asia
and Africa until the establishment of the Mormon Church. Id. at 164. The
Court continued:
[T] here never has been a time in any State of the Union when polyg-
amy has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the civil
courts and punishable with more or less severity. In the face of all this
evidence, it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of
religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to
this most important feature of social life. Marriage, while from its very
nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a
civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be
said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social
obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required
to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous marriages
are allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of the
people, to a greater or less extent, rests.... [Plolygamy leads to the
patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities,
fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot
long exist in connection with monogamy.
Id. at 165-66.
Years later, in Murphy v. Ramsey, the Court addressed a Congressional statute
which barred polygamists and bigamists from voting or from holding office.
114 U.S. 15, 17-20 (1884). The Court was unequivocal in its support of tradi-
tional, monogamous marriage. The Court declared that
[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and nec-
essary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to
take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that
which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as
consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and
one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in
social and political improvement. And to this end no means are more
directly and immediately suitable than those provided by this act,
which endeavors to withdraw all political influence from those who are
practically hostile to its attainment.
Id. at 45.
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The worry after Lawrence, moreover, is that the logic of same-sex
marriage leads to polygamous marriage. If two women can
marry, why not three? Or more? Why not a group of men and
women? In this extension of Lawrence's logic, states would be
powerless to limit marriage to couples-of any sort.
Marriage is distinctively the sexual communion of man and
woman, and this communion is geared to having children. This is
the central presupposition of many Supreme Court cases, among
them the Court's condemnation (in 1942) of an Oklahoma law
which punished certain career criminals with sterilization.4" The
Court there referred to "marriage and procreation" as "one of the
basic civil rights of man. ' 4' The states have always and, until Law-
rence, without constitutional inhibition protected marriage
through laws against non- and extra-marital sex. This protective
mantle also included, until the Court stepped in, laws concern-
ing illegitimacy, designed to limit procreation to married
couples.
The two types of laws are mutually reinforcing: limiting sex
to marriage increases the chance that kids will be born to mar-
ried couples; discouraging procreation outside of marriage and
discouraging non-marital intercourse helps to accomplish the
same goal. Even now states defending marriage against the
same-sex onslaught argue that they are upholding the time-
honored link among marriage, sexual activity, and procreation.
Vermont unsuccessfully pressed this argument in 1999.50 Indi-
ana has so far successfully deployed it against same-sex marriage
in pending litigation.51 "Marriage, sex, kids" is the standing mar-
riage defense policy.
The Supreme Court has disassembled these three goods. In
the first wave of disruption the Court ruled (beginning in 1968)
that most legal distinctions based upon illegitimacy are unconsti-
tutional. The seminal case was Levy v. Louisiana.52 The state laws
then challenged were justified as attempts to make marriage the
basis of family relationships.5 ' The Court brushed aside these
arguments. Apart from uncomprehending or inflamed rhetoric,
the Levy Court's main idea seems to have been that these unfair
burdens had no social value at all. They must have,Justice Doug-
48. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
50. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881-82 (Vt. 1999).
51. See Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946, slip op. at 10 (Ind.
Marion County Super. Ct. May 7, 2003).
52. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
53. See id. at 69 n.1.
LAW AND THE CULTURE OF MARRIAGE
las said in one of his most thoughtless opinions, originated in a
concern for "sin"-Douglas's scare quotes.54
Among the many sins of Lawrence is this: the Court stripped
from the states the authority to make marriage the principle of
sexual morality. By this "principle" I refer chiefly to the principle
of legally enforced public morality about sex: marriage is the
only morally appropriate setting for sexual activity. Justice John
Harlan provided a perfect illustration of what I mean, in his
opinion in the 1961 dress rehearsal of the Griswold case.
Harlan then and later voted with the liberals on marital privacy
and contraceptives; he was by that era's standards no old-fogey.
Harlan wrote that the laws about marriage provided "both when
the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context
in which children are born and brought up ... ."56 Marriage was
the basis for banning "adultery, fornication, and homosexual
practices," Harlan concluded, because these immoralities
"express the negative of the proposition" that marriage is the
context for sex.
Lawrence blasts all this out of the water. For the first time in
history, the Supreme Court held that the unmarried have a con-
stitutional right to have sex.58 Even the Eisenstadt case (1972), 59
which recognized some right of access to contraceptives for sin-
gle persons,6 ° expressly affirmed states' authority to punish non-
and extra-marital sex acts as crimes.6 The Eisenstadt court evi-
dently saw itself as eliminating the additional penalty of preg-
nancy by making contraceptives available to single people.62
After Lawrence, the constitutional principle of sexual moral-
ity is consent, not marriage. It is a good measure of our elites'
incomprehension of marriage and the law that Justice O'Connor
said that Texas' sodomy law had no rational basis, while affirming
54. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 335 (1968) (Douglas,J., concurring).
55. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
56. Id. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (holding that peti-
tioners were entitled to engage in private "sexual practices common to their
homosexual lifestyle").
59. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
60. See id. at 454-55.
61. Id. at 448 ("[clonceding that the State could, consistently with the
Equal Protection Clause, regard the problems of extramarital and premarital
sexual relations as 'evils . . .'") (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 548 U.S. 483,
489 (1955)).
62. Id. ("It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts
has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment
for fornication .... ").
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that "preserving the traditional institution of marriage" was a
rational basis.6" As Justice Harlan would say, that is the basis of
all the laws which Lawrence struck down.
After this long march through the maze of legal authority
over marriage in the United States, we finally reach an unspoiled
state preserve: divorce. Or do we? On the legal landscape we see
a familiar pattern: the principle of no-fault marital dissolution in
place all across the country, with state variations. In this case,
however, the pattern of national principle/state specification is
not the result of an overriding Supreme Court decision. No
Supreme Court decision contradicts the black-letter principle:
"divorce is a state concern." (This principle is subject, of course,
to constitutional side-constraints conditioning the exercise of all
state power. Thus, no state may condition a divorce decree upon
a confession of faith, or make divorce more difficult for Hispan-
ics to obtain than it is for non-Hispanics.)
The Lawrence "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage 64-everyone has
a constitutional right to live in his own moral universe-should
not be ignored. After Lawrence one should doubt whether the
sexually-expressive free agent "at the heart of liberty" could be
denied a marital exit. It seems likely that, at least where both
spouses consent, no state could deny them a divorce.
Even if it were the case that states are in charge of defining
marriage, the federalism argument would not be compelling.
One common justification for federalism is that, rather than
straitjacket the whole nation with a single legal template, it is bet-
ter to allow states to experiment with different legal solutions to
social problems. That way, we can eventually figure out what
really works and what does not. Another common justification is
that problems vary a lot from state to state and that these local
variations demand different responses. One response might be
right in Utah, an incompatible response right in Arizona, and
both could be wrong in New Jersey.
Neither of these virtues of federalism has any traction on the
marriage question. There is one problem, and one solution.
The question is whether men can marry men, and women,
women. The common good requires everywhere this answer: no.
Nothing peculiar to New York or to Wyoming makes any differ-
ence: same-sex marriage is impossible everywhere, and should be
legally prohibited all over. There is no need to experiment,
63. 123 S. Ct. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 2481 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
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either. The solution to the problem is singular, plain, and sim-
ple: no same-sex marriage.
At one time in our history states did indeed enjoy almost
total control over marriage. This was part of a much wider reti-
cence of national power. States controlled education, health,
welfare, and the economy in ways scarcely imaginable to us. This
autonomy was not all to the good: slavery was another "domestic
institution" shielded from federal regulation.
State control over marriage and family is not morally neces-
sary. No moral norms lead through sound reasoning, either
deductively or by strong inference, to the conclusion: marriage is
something to be regulated exclusively, or even mainly, by local
authorities. It is generally better for smaller units of operation to
do the jobs within their competence. But this principle of sub-
sidiarity does not provide criteria of "competence": what if the
smaller unit (the states, for example) are unable to protect mar-
riage from outside threats, save by calling for national help? This
is our situation now, for the FMA will not become law unless
thirty-eight states ratify it. That would be a pretty good showing
that the states want outside help.
Non-lawyers might well say about the federalism criticism: so
what? Non-lawyers might think that the marriage question needs
to be answered rightly, not (wrongly) by the (assertedly) right
authority. Non-lawyers might even think that any authority
which gets the answer wrong is the wrong authority.
The non-lawyers have a point: getting the law about mar-
riage right is profoundly important. Where public authority gets
this law wrong, it does great and perhaps irreparable damage to
the common good. Persons' opportunities for genuine human
flourishing are significantly diminished. Now, if it is the case
that, according to the controlling positive law, a task is unam-
biguously given exclusively to a particular governmental unit,
that is it. Failure to tend properly to the chore does not, by itself,
forfeit competence or cause a transfer of authority. The Consti-
tution plainly says that the Senate shall have "sole power to try all
impeachments."" No matter how badly the Senators perform
this job, no one seriously believes that some other body, say the
United States Court of Claims, could acquire power over
impeachments for that reason alone. The only way to transfer
the power is to amend the Constitution; Senate malfeasance may
be a good reason to try just that.
No one seriously believes that states' control over marriage is
exclusive ("sole") or clear in anything like the way the Senate's
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 6.
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power over impeachment is. In a case of this type-shared,
blurred lines of authority, at most-the states' unwillingness or
inability to do the job right properly enters into the question of
where power lies. Put differently, there is surely reason to doubt
that the sexual complementarity of marriage is, or should be, or
has been, wholly for states to maintain. I think it better to give
benefit of this doubt to a protection that will really protect: the
FMA.
VI
Let us take stock. For at least a generation states have had
little authority over the basic definition of marriage. The FMA is
neither unusual nor unprecedented, and it is necessary. States
have always had-and still have-autonomy when it comes to the
"incidents" of marriage-the benefits, duties, privileges of the
married state. These packages are particular to each state. State
authority over incidents is affirmed by the FMA.
I turn to whipsawing criticisms of 82 of the FMA.
The first criticism of 82 is made by people I call "liberation-
ists." They complain that effective concessions to same-sex
couples are impossible. Judges will not be able to "construe"
(read: "apply," "enforce") statutes conceding benefits to unmar-
ried couples, because 82 blocks them from doing so. The second
criticism is made by "traditionalists." They say that S2 recognizes
real legislative authority, much more than is appropriate. "Tradi-
tionalists" would concede very little, if anything, to unmarried
couples, and say that 82 fails by that measure. The criticisms can-
not be both correct. In truth, both are mistaken, the liberation-
ist completely so, and the traditionalist largely so. They are
mistaken for basically the same reason.
The liberationist criticism presupposes that there is a tran-
scendent set of benefits, not tied to the law of any particularjuris-
diction, called "the incidents of marriage." The legal treatises
and academic wise men compile lists of these common or typical
"incidents." Wherever legislators seek to extend a member of
this free-floating set of goods to unmarried couples, 82 stands in
the way. On this account of 82, a court could not even apply a
statute which makes no reference to marriage, spouses, hus-
bands, wives. So long as the statute dealt with a canonical "inci-
dent"-say bereavement leave or dependent health benefits or a
testimonial privilege-S2 prevents courts from treating it as law.
The presupposition is correct. The treatises do list common
marital incidents, with growing disagreement about what
remains on this shrinking list. But the treatises and leading cases
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also list the common property crimes, the duties of a corporate
trustee, an estate executor, as well as the jobs of surety, a third-
party contractual beneficiary, along with the typical marital
incidents.
But there is no crime against property in, say, Indiana,
unless it is listed in the current Indiana Penal Code. Corporate
trustees in Arkansas have those duties and only those duties
which Arkansas law actually imposes. Any lawyer who submitted
a brief to the New York Court of Appeals on suretyship citing
only treatises and digests would be guilty of malpractice.
The conclusion is therefore wrong. Nothing is an incident of
marriage unless extant state law makes it so. There are no "state-
less" incidents of marriage. "Marital incidents" are not goods
floating free of the positive law. They do not form a brooding
omnipresence in the sky. State law makes this or that benefit a
marital incident by, and only by, saying that it is. The state says
that it is by saying that the beneficiary is one's "lawful spouse" or
"husband" or "wife," or by saying that the privilege accrues to
lawfully married couples. Where these words are used, there is a
marital incident. Where these (or cognate) words are used, no
court may extend the benefit to unmarried couples or groups.
(See 82.) Where some such formula is not used, there is no inci-
dent of marriage.
A legislature which wants to give unmarried people some
benefit previously reserved to the married (something hitherto
an "incident of marriage") may do so under the FMA. Legisla-
tors so inclined would have to identify the benefit, and then
define the beneficiary class without using terms such as "mar-
riage" and "spouse." These lawmakers accomplish two things:
they abolish an "incident of marriage," and they pass a new law, or
social welfare measure, or rule of evidence, or tax provision.
These two things may happen at once and are intended to be in
tandem. But they are conceptually quite distinct.
To illustrate: desiring to extend to unmarried couples the
bereavement leave presently reserved for spouses, the Iowa legis-
lature writes a new law. It says (in effect): any state worker is
entitled to a day off to grieve when an individual within the
worker's household dies. S2 is no obstacle to judicial enforce-
ment of this hypothetical law, because it involves no marital
incident.
Another illustration: the Montana legislature wants to
extend a host of financial benefits, currently enjoyed by married
couples, to unmarried couples and even to their children (where
they have custody of kids). S2 requires that the legislators do so
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by writing a law for, say, households, defined by financial interde-
pendence and co-habitation, leaving marriage and cognate
words out of the bill. Judges may apply and enforce ("construe,"
if you like) this law without hindrance by S2.
There are more illustrations. Husbands and wives typically
make each other health-care proxies. But anyone can be your
healthcare proxy, and a same-sex couple can do what husband
and wife do. That does not make them married; they are simply
mutual proxies. Any two people can sign a lease or co-sign a
mortgage these days, and married couples typically do. Two men
leasing a flat are not therefore married; they are joint tenants.
One side-effect of this understanding of the FMA is that the
thorny question of legally recognizing same-sex relationships by
name can be put aside. Are they parties to a "civil union"? Are
they "domestic partners"? If neither, what are they to be called?
Do any such names convey approval of what is, in truth, an
immoral sexual relationship?
Si forbids recognizing any non-marital relationship by any
name if the relationship is defined, even in part, by sex. 82
requires legislators to extend benefits, if they choose to extend
them at all, one-by-one, establishing generic legal relationships
(joint tenants, beneficiaries) as they go. There does not arise a
need to name the whole relationship.
Clarifying the "liberationist" mistake helps us to see what is
wrong with a leading "traditionalist" criticism. Traditionalists
want to keep all (or almost all) marital benefits marital: the
unmarried need not apply. S1 of their ideal amendment would
be the same as S1 of the FMA. But traditionalists think that S2 is
way too permissive. Their second sentence of the FMA would say
something like, "Neither marriage nor its legal incidents shall be
given to unmarried couples or groups."
The precise effect of 82 is just what traditionalists want-no
incidents of marriage to the unmarried, period. Though literally
true, this response is misleading. S2 allows state legislators to do
what traditionalists say they should not-effectively to extend
marital incidents to a wider group, including some unmarried
couples. It is worth noting, however, that the pace of this retail
reform likely will be deliberate, if not slow, and that it will stop
well short of a fire sale of marital incidents.
There are two problems with the traditionalists' approach,
besides its deep affront to federalism. The first problem is the
more severe: their second sentence is impotent. It prohibits the
states from extending marital incidents, but it does not prevent
states from abolishing them. The conceptual two-step of my hypo-
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thetical Iowa and Montana legislators would pass muster under
the traditionalist amendment.
The second problem is vagueness. Like the first, the prob-
lem arises from the mistake common to liberationists and tradi-
tionalists: both camps think there are "state-less" incidents. But
the traditionalists' amendment pivots upon the idea. It is there-
fore no more definite than is the notion of free-floating marital
incidents.
I observed earlier that this set grows more unstable by the
day; experts disagree strenuously on what is really, or inescap-
ably, an incident of marriage anymore. The most important inci-
dents of marriage are those which link procreation and sex to
marriage. The crimes listed by justice Harlan helped everyone to
abstain from sex until marriage, reduced temptation to stray
from marital commitments, and punished those who interfered
with spouses' vows. Another vastly important incident was the
fault-based divorce regime, which gave the blameless spouse real
leverage in any divorce and child custody situation. But these
incidents are off every expert's list, often due to overriding
Supreme Court precedent. Do the traditionalists mean to
restore some, or all, of these incidents? Their language would
not do so. Revised language that might solve both problems
could list all the incidents never to be extended to unmarried
couples. But that would make the amendment unwieldy, plunge
it to depths of minutiae unbecoming the Constitution, and spark
more disagreement than it would settle.
CONCLUSION
The FMA will surely not cure all that ails marriage. The
FMA will forestall legal recognition of same-sex couples as
spouses. But the "same-sex marriage" movement is more a symp-
tom than a cause of marriage's malaise. We are forty or so years
into a continuing heterosexual rebellion against chastity, and
against the challenges of married life. The startling progress of
this rebellion explains why the case for "same-sex marriage" is as
plausible as it seems. The FMA nonetheless will staunch the
bleeding of marriage, perhaps long enough for another genera-
tion of Americans-our children-to rebel against their elders'
rebellion.
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